Commentary: Olympian Fire: Tibet's China Tibetan Problem

Published on Monday, April 28, 2008
By Gilbert NMO Morris

As a professor, one of the first things one must do is to remove sophomoric impressions from the minds of students; helping them to see the world as it is, rather than as they wish; just so that those ‘wishes’ are better informed.

Dr Gilbert NMO Morris is an economist & legal scholar who taught at several American universities. He founded The Landfall Centre for Finance, Trade & International Affairs, which gained international prominence advising financial centres during the blacklisting. He is Chairman of CAICOS Brothers LP & MDB International.

Few problems in the world are beset with wishful (sometimes foolish) thinking as the China-Tibet question. First, let me say (because one has to in such a climate) that no one wants to see the culture of Tibet preserved any more than I do. However, my feelings are utterly irrelevant to cultivating a solution to the immediate and long-term situation in Tibet.

Tibetans and the Chinese are served incompetently by two groups: cowardly foreign policy establishment who “curry-favour” and treat the Chinese as if they will not respond to reason and the itinerant protesters who find every excuse to vulgarize the subtly of complex situations by wailing ungovernably in the streets.

In this respect, I find it stunning that any national leader would agree to withdraw from the Olympic Opening Ceremonies. That France has seen fit to advance the cause is telling in itself. Given their handling of a genuine policy problem in the ghettos of Paris only recently, one hardly finds France (sadly Glorious France), a compelling proponent of political sanguinity.

Let’s speak in mature policy, rather than emotional terms: First, we must understand the nature of China and Chinese political sensibilities.

China, throughout much of its history (perhaps except in the period of the Great Kahn 1260 -1294; Yuan Dynasty), has suffered from a sense of vulnerability. In defence of its borders, it has been both as delicate as the Lotus leaf and as fierce as a dragon. China is not the sort of power with whom threats are effective, as say Russia. In foreign policy, China is a power in which a win-win is the ultimate balance between competing interests.

Therefore, those who now suggest boycotting the opening ceremonies of the Olympics do little more than undermine the possibility of the very cessation of impositions they seek in Tibet.

The more foolish amongst us -- for whom the obvious is fascinating -- will cite that China has now -- under pressure -- agreed to hold talks with the Dali Lama’s representatives.

But what does it betoken?

When considering strategic options in foreign policy one takes an aggressive position only where some other force or circumstance creates pressure from another direction. The Olympics last for two weeks. It is a temporary force at best and not one which can compose with the current protests and likely boycotts to force a resolution to the Tibetan problem.

It would have been much better to have sent a multi-lateral delegation to China to discuss the matter, and to have them emerge from the meeting with the Chinese with a solution likely to survive the temporary pressure of the Olympics; an Olympian effort, in an Olympic spirit to save face for the Chinese Olympics.

(I must not hesitate to add -- with proper respect for Tibetans -- that it is hypocritical to see so many waxed so eloquent on Tibet, when Mugabe is destroying lives in Zimbabwe at will and without fear of international reprisal.)

Now let us turn to the situation in geo-political terms, so that we are better informed as to the nature of the problem.

First, on geo-political questions, geography is destiny. Consider the geography of Tibet. It is one of the five autonomous regions, inhabited by people of Tibetan ethnicity. The southwest border province of Tibet forms the southwestern portion of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; equaling12.8 percent of China's total land area averaging more than 4,000 metres in elevation, known as the "roof of the world."

Tibet is “ridged into its landscape by the Himalayas in the South, and the Gobi Desert in the North; the Sichuan Basin in the East and the Tarim Basin in the West. These extremities frame the Tibetan Plateau. The Himalayas are a group of mountain ranges running roughly parallel to one another in an east-west direction on the southern edge of the Tibet Plateau along China's border with India and Nepal.

Why this detail? Because we are speaking of geo-strategic security issues. And if the rest of the world wants to save Tibet (as I do), then it has to grow up a face the geo-political realities of China’s interest in Tibet and Tibet’s China security problem.

It should be noted, not only have I written about this issue more than three years ago, but so has senior foreign policy practitioners such as Dr. Henry Kissinger in not dissimilar terms. However, they have been satisfied to accept that the issue is too complex and its solution -- whilst desirable in human rights terms -- offered little in the way of geo-political balance. As we shall see they were and are wrong.

Here is the problem, in a nutshell: Tibet sits high on a plateau, with India at its back facing China, 5,000 metres below. In military terms, the force with the hill has the advantage. That force in China’s mind is not likely to be Tibet, but India or even Russia (gaining access from the Steppes along the Yarlong River). Tibet’s pacific (peaceful, non-violent) tradition therefore leaves China vulnerable to invasion; something it has been sensitive to for nearly 3,000 years.

Put simply: Tibet is a “soft spot” between two hard places. You may say the Indians have no designs on China; which is like telling a father, the muscular boy next door has no designs on his daughter. It does not work. Moreover, in the “stranger things have happened category”, China has 300 centuries of knowledge and history against our feverish speculations. Only skilled diplomacy and critical, verifiable assurances will prove effective here.